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ne of the major problems of the eurozone is the divergence of the competitive 
positions that have built up since the early 2000s. This divergence has led to major 
imbalances in the eurozone where the countries that have seen their competitive 
positions deteriorate (mainly the ‘PIIGS’ – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) have 
accumulated large current account deficits and thus external indebtedness, matched by 
current account surpluses of the countries that have improved their competitive positions 
(mainly Germany). 
There is now a large consensus that in order to correct these imbalances it will be necessary 
for the PIIGS to engineer an ‘internal devaluation’, i.e. to reduce prices and wages relative to 
Germany and the other core countries. There is no doubt that such an ‘internal devaluation’ 
is painful as it tends to reduce aggregate demand and domestic production. This in turn 
increases government budget deficits and deteriorates the fiscal position of the countries 
concerned. Countries forced to engineer an internal devaluation risk being pushed into a 
‘bad equilibrium’.  
All this leads to a lot of pessimism about the capacity of the PIIGS countries to get out of 
these bad equilibria. Many commentators now take it for granted that the PIIGS countries 
will not easily improve their competitive positions and that they will be stuck in their bad 
equilibria for years to come. Is this pessimism warranted? In Figure 1, I show the evolution 
of the competitive positions of the PIIGS countries (measured by their relative unit labour 
costs) since 1999. Two features stand out. First, from 1999 until 2008/09, one observes the 
strong deterioration of these countries’ competitive positions. Second, since 2008/09, quite 
dramatic turnarounds of the competitive positions have occurred in Ireland, Spain and 
Greece, and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Italy.  
We show the sizes of these internal devaluations that have occurred in the PIIGS countries 
since 2008-09 in Table 1. We compute the internal devaluations by the difference between the 
competitiveness index at its peak (which in some countries occurs in 2008, in others in 2009) 
and the index in 2012. This difference is expressed as a percentage, and can be interpreted as 
an internal devaluation, i.e. it measures the decline in the relative unit labour costs of these 
countries achieved between the peak year and the year 2012. From Table 1 we observe that 
the Irish internal devaluation of 23.5% is substantial. The internal devaluations of Greece and 
Spain (11.4% and 8.9%) are lower but significant. The internal devaluations of Portugal and 
Italy are much less impressive.  
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From the preceding analysis one can conclude that the burden of the adjustments to the 
imbalances in the eurozone between the surplus and the deficit countries is borne almost 
exclusively by the deficit countries in the periphery. Surely some symmetry in the 
adjustment mechanism would alleviate the pain in the deficit countries. The surplus 
countries, however, do not seem to be willing to make life easier for the deficit countries and 
to take their part of responsibilities in correcting external imbalances.  
The asymmetry in the adjustment mechanism in the eurozone is reminiscent of similar 
asymmetries in the fixed exchange rate regimes of the Bretton Woods and the European 
Monetary System. In both these exchange rate regimes the burden of adjustment to external 
disequilibria was borne mostly by the deficit countries.  
The asymmetry of the fixed exchange rate regimes arose because deficit countries at some 
point where hit by balance-of-payments crises that depleted their stock of international 
reserves. Empty-handed, they had to turn to creditor nations that imposed their conditions, 
including an adjustment process to eliminate the deficits. Creditor nations ruled supremely.  
The European Monetary Union would change all that. This appears to have been an idle 
hope. The adjustment process within the eurozone seems to be as asymmetric as the 
adjustment mechanisms of the fixed exchange rate regimes. Why is this? The answer is not 
because of balance-of-payments crises. There can be no balance-of-payments crises in the 
same sense as those that occurred in fixed exchange rate systems, because in a monetary 
union internal foreign exchange markets have disappeared. Another mechanism is at work 
in a monetary union.  
This mechanism arises from the inherent fragility of a monetary union in which national 
governments issue debt in a currency over which they exert no control (De Grauwe, 2011). 
When in such a system the fiscal position of a country deteriorates, e.g. due to the 
deflationary effects of an internal devaluation, investors may be gripped by fear leading to a 
collective movement of distrust. The ensuing bond sales lead to a liquidity squeeze in the 
country concerned. This ‘sudden stop’ in turn leads to a situation in which the government 
of the distressed country finds it impossible to fund its outstanding debt except at 
prohibitively high interest rates. It follows that in the absence of a lender of last resort, 
individual governments of a monetary union can be driven into default by financial market 
panics.  
In order to avoid default, the crisis-hit government has to turn hat in hand to the creditor 
countries, which, like their fixed exchange rate predecessors, impose tough conditions. As 
the creditor countries profit from the liquidity inflow from the distressed country and are 
awash with liquidity, no pressure is exerted on these countries to do their part of the 
adjustment. The creditor countries reign supremely and impose their rule on the system.  
The European Commission has now been invested with the important responsibility of 
monitoring and correcting macroeconomic imbalances in the framework of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). The key idea in the MIP is symmetry, i.e. 
imbalances between surplus and deficit countries should be treated and corrected 
symmetrically. As our analysis illustrates, up to now the European Commission does not 
seem to be willing (or able) to impose symmetry on the adjustment process. It imposes a lot 
of pressure on the deficit countries but fails to impose similar pressure on the surplus 
countries. The effect of this failure is that the eurozone is being kept in a deflationary 
straitjacket. 
All this does not bode well for the future enforcement of symmetry in the macroeconomic 
adjustments in the eurozone. The MIP is unlikely to work symmetrically for the same reason 
that the EMS did not. In the absence of a lender of last resort in the eurozone, deficit IN SEARCH OF SYMMETRY IN THE EUROZONE | 5 
 
countries will remain in a structurally weak position vis-à-vis surplus countries each time 
market sentiments turns against them. This will continue to make it easier for the European 
Commission to impose tougher adjustment conditions on the deficit countries than on the 
surplus countries, thereby becoming the agent representing the interests of the creditor 
countries. The tyranny of the creditor countries in the eurozone will not disappear quickly.  